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7 January 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Lieutenant General Edward J. Heinz, USAF
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Reflections on Intelligence Collection for Verification [redacted]

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REFERENCE: Memorandum from Director, ACDA to DCI, [redacted] dtd
December 1987, subject same as above

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1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached response (Attachment A) to the Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA). [redacted]

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2. Background: Mr. Kenneth Adelman, former Director of the U.S. Arms Control Disarmament Agency, sent you a memorandum (copy in folder on left) just prior to his departure from ACDA a few weeks ago. Mr. Adelman discusses needed improvements in national technical means to allow arms control policies to be pursued with confidence. In particular, he urges that resources be found to support [redacted] that he considers vital for verification efforts. Attachment B contains a capsule description of [redacted]

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3. While former Director Adelman has good ideas, implementing them all will be very hard and probably impossible. The key reasons are substantive and fiscal. While it is true that the Intelligence Community's collection and analysis efforts have been strengthened over the past several years with respect to supporting the President's arms control objectives, the detailed needs for effective monitoring and verification continue to be worked in the broader intelligence context. It is nonetheless clear that our ability to effectively monitor arms control accords [redacted] There are many reasons for this. One is that the USSR is more knowledgeable of our capabilities; another is that the administration has sought accords with broad-reaching, stringent provisions. [redacted]

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4. The INF Treaty pioneered cooperative measures that, as a set, should improve our confidence in the total elimination of intermediate range weapons. Monitoring and verification of a potential START agreement, however, will be much more complex. The fact that the detailed provisions of an agreement are not yet clear is one difficulty inhibiting our ability to define intelligence collection system requirements. Further complications will stem from the role of mobile missiles and the fact that strategic weapon systems will be cut but not eliminated.

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5. As the Intelligence Community focuses on its role in support of the INF Treaty, we must continue to be mindful of the broad set of national intelligence needs facing US policymaking and national security. Similarly, with regard to strategic arms control verification measures, the Intelligence Community continually assesses its collection and analytic resources in terms of our ability to respond to the current and future needs of the senior policymakers as the strategic treaty framework is developed.

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6. As you are aware, a wide set of intelligence requirements, gaps and initiatives were surfaced in the study conducted this past summer for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Those results, along with some study efforts recently conducted by the DCI's Measurement and Signature Intelligence Committee, addressed all of the enhancements to national technical means referred to in the ACDA memorandum. Collectively, each has relative merit with respect to adding measurably to the solution of a number of intelligence requirements in addition to supporting INF and strategic arms control.

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7. But fiscal reality probably will prevent us from achieving all of the items on former Director Adelman's list. The numbers for FY 1988, 1989, and the outyears will not allow new increases, either for program expansions or new acquisitions. In fact, programs were not funded even at the original DCI guidance levels for 1988 and 1989. The bottom line remains the severity of constrained intelligence resources and budgets. It is in this context that we will continue to monitor closely all future collection enhancement options and seek choices commensurate with the highest priority needs for the entire Intelligence Community.

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8. This package was reviewed in draft by NIO/SP, C/ACIS, C/CRES/CIA, and as well by similar officers at DIA and NSA. Any major comments are included or noted.

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9. Recommendation: Sign the response at Attachment A.

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SUBJECT: Reflections on Intelligence Collection for Verification

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10. If there is anything more you would like us to do here, please let me know.

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Edward O. Heinz
Lieutenant General, USAF

Attachments:

A. Memorandum to Acting Director, ACDA

B. Capsule Description

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[REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: Reflections on Intelligence Collection for Verification (U)

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DCI/ICS/MASINT([REDACTED] December 1987)

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Retyped: DCI/OD/IC[REDACTED] 6 Jan 88

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

28 JAN 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable David F. Emery
Acting Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Intelligence Collection for Verification [redacted]

1. Thank you for the recent memorandum from former Director Kenneth Adelman in which he provided his reflections on this subject. [redacted]

2. I appreciate hearing the views of senior policy officers on their needs for help from U.S. intelligence. Such statements help us keep our requirements focused, as well as keep our fiscal decisions as close to the target as possible. [redacted]

3. As former Director Adelman points out, a lot has been done over the last several years to strengthen U.S. intelligence. I agree that we need to continue to seek improvements in our national technical means of verification, in addition to other needed improvements in such areas as communications and human source intelligence. More specifically, I also agree [redacted] items listed in Director Adelman's memorandum all have merit, both for arms control monitoring and for many other important intelligence areas as well. [redacted]

4. It is truly unfortunate, then, that the fiscal reality of severely constrained intelligence budgets in FY 1989 and the outyears will prevent us from funding several of the items on Ken's list. While we will do our best to fund [redacted] for example, I can foresee no way at the moment that we will be able to fund either the increase in [redacted] satellites or buy [redacted]. The simple fact is that we do not have the money scheduled in the National Foreign Intelligence Program [redacted] either for program expansions or acquisitions. In fact, [redacted] were not funded even at the original DCI guidance levels for 1988 and 1989. The unpleasant situation is that, without relief from budget pressures, we likely will not be able to even keep [redacted] we are buying now. [redacted]

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SUBJECT: Intelligence Collection for Verification (U)

5. Even so, we will be continuing our work on various advanced technologies, both for satellite and other applications. For example, as I indicated to the Congress in September of last year, we are examining the analytic value of various approaches to [redacted] As money becomes available in the National Foreign Intelligence Program for such a system, we will be able to decide promptly which approach to take. [redacted]

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6. Even with these painful facts, however, I agree that our two organizations need to continue to work closely. We have done so successfully in the past and we should keep at it. Your continuing interest and involvement are important to U.S. intelligence and I look forward to continuing to hear ACDA's views. [redacted]

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/s/ William H. Webster

William H. Webster

cc: The Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

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